Homesick...An Essay on War and the American Homefront

I often wake up hoping I’d be in a cot. Hearing Jason screaming the lyrics to barbie girl. I’d roll over and click play on the pre-mission playlist; Big Krits  “Rise and Shine” plays. Maybe Poly would come in and slap my foot and say lets get chow or Ryan would have already been up giving me his leftovers while I tell him his sister is beautiful, A running joke that has been going on for nearly 4 years now.

I wake up in a full size bed on Long Island. No chow hall but easily accessible food everywhere in sight. I can get a breakfast sandwich if I really wanted. Freshy Fresh isn’t too far. I no longer see the faces I’ve grown comfortable and accustomed to seeing. The things that were so agitating have become memories and jokes. We would tip beer bottles and laugh about the indirect fire and Rashaldo’s reaction to it. The time when First Squad’s tent got deflated because of people playing with knives. It was a big deal, angry faces and threats left and right but in the end, why be mad? Brothers forgive. I can still hear Big Davis, Gabe, and Tony P arguing over the state of hip hop. Life was simple. Life was good.Life wasn’t promised.

When over there things didn’t matter. It just was. We had no control over what happened back in the United States. The only thing we could do is complete the task at hand. When that was done we had to enjoy the time we had. We never wanted to go there but we were there. We made the best of what it was. We hated the taste of dust in our mouths. We hated 10th Mountain’s leadership for making the rules that made our lives difficult. We hated the Taliban. We hated the IED’S.

We landed in El Paso, Texas and said hello to America. We put on normal clothes, Laced something other than combat boots and PT shoes, and Hopped in vehicles that weren’t MIne Resistant. Something felt missing and couldn’t explain what it was. Unlocking the door to our barracks room felt unreal. Eating jack in the box couldn’t compare to taco Tuesday on FOB Arian. The shopping mall didnt give you the same excitement as the PX on FOB Sharana. The comforts of America no longer made us feel normal. This wasn’t where we belonged. We became home sick for the place we never thought we would call home.

- Andy Gomez, Combat Engineer

The bankruptcy of political rhetoric

The bobble heads in the right wing media are still banging the drum that "Obama withdrew US forces from Iraq" and that this event foretold the rise of ISIS. They regurgitate this pablum for the masses even though the previous Administration agreed to the 2008 SOFA that not only stipulated US forces withdraw NLT 31 December 2011....but also decreed that any future SOFA agreements would have to be ratified by the Iraqi Council of Representatives [CoR]. As we well know.....the CoR was not about to ratify any renegotiation of the SOFA in 2011, at least not with legal immunity for US forces from the Iraqi judicial system. So either these bobble heads are stupid...or they think that their audience is stupid. Or, they would sacrifice the immunity of US forces to a corrupt and Iranian-backed regime in Baghdad.

These same bobble heads attempt to castigate the current Administration for announcing a withdrawal date for US forces in Afghanistan....when the previous Administration did exactly the same for US force in Iraq.

It makes me feel icky any time I have to speak up for the current regime at 1600 Penn....but when the opposition is just as shallow and bereft of reason.......I see any hope for our future dim.

Always a Brother.....

Soldiers dressed in full Army Dress Blues filled the front seats of Mountain View High School graduation ceremony on June 7, 2014; a unique sight, even for a city located just outside a military installation. As Lluvia Loeza’s name was called, the Soldiers rose to their feet and rendered a salute. 

Lluvia’s brother, Staff Sgt. Roberto Loeza, Jr., was an Infantry Rifle Squad Leader and Headquarters Platoon Sergeant in Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division out of Fort Bliss, Tx. He deployed with the unit to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2011. Before leaving, he made a promise to his youngest sister, Lluvia, that he would be at her graduation to watch her walk the stage but unfortunately could not keep that promise.  

Staff Sgt. William Berry a member of Charlie Company and a friend and comrade of Roberto, stated that, “Staff Sgt. Roberto Loeza, Jr. was a loving and caring father and family man. His Soldiers held him in very high regard and respected his leadership and presence.” 

Roberto died of injuries sustained by indirect fire on May 25, 2012 while serving in Logar Province, Afghanistan.  

Roberto’s brother, Esteban, wanted to surprise their sister. He sent out a message through Facebook to Roberto’s old unit asking for volunteers to stand in his place. The call was answered immediately.  

Though the majority of the unit is deployed once again to Afghanistan, the Battalion’s rear detachment known as Task Force Stalwart West led by the Battalion Executive Officer, Maj. George Chigi, along with Maj. Christopher Penwarden and Sgt. 1st Class Bernie Brooks, organized a group of Soldiers to attend Lluvia’s graduation.  

More than 30 Soldiers from 1-4 Infantry Battalion attended the graduation. Also in attendance were several Soldiers from the Ft Bliss area that knew Roberto well including Penwarden and Sgt. 1st Class Jason Yeazel.  

Lluvia was completely surprised by the Straight and Stalwart Battalion Soldiers who gathered in their Army Service Uniforms. Making the event even more special for her, Chigi was given permission by the school district’s superintendent to present Lluvia with her high school diploma.  

Lluvia was just as impressive as her older brother; her discipline and drive earned her the distinction of the 4th highest grade point average in her high school. Lluvia’s brother is sure to have been proud to know that Lluvia’s efforts earned her more than $100,000 in college scholarships. 

The entire Loeza family was overwhelmed with emotion. They were happy to see so much support from the Straight and Stalwart Battalion for their son and Lluvia. The families of the other graduating students were awestruck by 1-41 Infantry Battalion as it rendered honors to Lluvia, the family, and Roberto. 

“It was a very emotional and uplifting event for us and the family. All and all we fulfilled a fallen Soldier’s promise and we did it with pride and honor and represented the 1-41 Infantry Battalion with nothing but the upmost respect and pleasure doing it for the family,” said Brooks, the Charlie Company First Sergeant.

Link

If hear one more time.......

the equating of the Quetta Shura Taliban...with al Qaeda and 9/11...equating the aims, motivations and threat posed to the United States......

I'm going to lose my shit.

I expect nothing less than vacant-eyed, mouth-breathing, slack-jawed sensationalism from our shit media......but I would really like to hold Congress to a higher standard.

Pipe dream, I know.

The Curious Case of the Walkabout Deserter

So Bowe Bergdahl has been released in exchange for five Taliban detainees. I'm happy we have him back, but what would otherwise be euphoria over the return of a Brother-in-Arms, is tempered by the fact that he deserted during wartime.

UCMJ Article 85. Desertion 

(a) Any member of the armed forces who– 

(1) without authority goes or remains absent from his unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to remain away therefrom permanently;(2) quits his unit, organization, or place of duty with intent to avoid hazardous duty or to shirk important service; or(3) without being regularly separated from one of the armed forces enlists or accepts an appointment in the same or another on of the armed forces without fully disclosing the fact that he has not been regularly separated, or enters any foreign armed service except when authorized by the United States; is guilty of desertion. 

(b) Any commissioned officer of the armed forces who, after tender of his resignation and before notice of its acceptance, quits his post or proper duties without leave and with intent to remain away therefrom permanently is guilty of desertion. 

(c) Any person found guilty of desertion or attempt to desert shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the desertion or attempt to desert occurs at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct.

Bowe Bergdahl left OP Mest in Paktika Province, where he was a member of B 1/501st (ABN). He left in the dead of night, without his weapon and kit. And according to some who served with him, he left after acting and speaking strangely...about the war, his 'purpose in life', etc....

Some of his teammates have stated other points about his 'capture'...but that isn't confirmed, at least for public knowledge. But we do know this.....as soon as he entered status as a DUSTWUN [Duty Status Whereabouts Unknown]...a massive amount of resources were pulled away from scheduled missions, countless lives were endangered [and some quite possibly lost] looking for Bergdahl and his 'captors'. Some accounting can be read over at The Liberty Zone. Another unverified source is the Twitter account of one who claims to have been in Bergdahl's platoon at OP Mest. I can't vouch for the account, but as a longtime Infantry guy....his accounts ring true.

Although he will be the subject of an Article 15-6 investigation, I think it is likely that the ruling will be that he had 'suffered' enough at hands of his captors, and he will be medically discharged from service with a pretty enormous amount of back pay and the status of former prisoner of war. Nobody is going to wish to shine light on how Bergdahl's actions prior to his 'capture' went unnoticed, unreported, or un-actioned. Nobody is going to wish to shine lift on how Bergdahl was able to leave OP Mest undetected and unmolested.

Much hay is being made of the fact that we 'negotiated with terrorists', and the underlying implication that this position is US policy and something we simply do not do. However, a cursory scan of the history of US foreign policy will reveal that we always negotiate with terrorists. And we always will. Much of it doesn't come to light, and much of it is whitewashed for public consumption, but the fact remains.

Frankly, I'm not worried abut the five Taliban detainees that were released in exchange for Bergdahl. The Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani Network, HiG and lesser groups, do not pose a transitional threat to the homeland.

But this will be another act in the politico-media theater that drives most people's lives and gives them something to bitch about.

Courage and Character Personified......

Army Ranger Josh Hargis was unconscious, hooked to a breathing tube at a military hospital in Afghanistan after losing both his legs in battle last week.

But when the Purple Heart ceremony began at Hargis’ bedside, it turned out he was not unconscious, as doctors believed. Instead, he struggled with an attending doctor to raise his heavily bandaged hand to salute a commanding officer presenting him with the medal.

"I cannot impart on you the level of emotion that poured through the intensive care unit that day," the commander wrote to the Ranger's wife. "Grown men began to weep, and we were speechless at a gesture that speaks volumes about Josh's courage and character."

There were about 50 fellow Rangers, doctors and nurses in the hospital room during the ceremony. The commanding officer said the salute was the “most beautiful” any person in the room had ever seen.

Link

SSG Ty Carter - American Hero

Afghan Disconnect

An excellent interview in Small Wars Journal with Rajiv Chandrasekaran, author of Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan.

One gets the sense in looking back over the 2009 White House strategy review that then led to the President’s decision to largely accept McChrystal’s request for more forces that the military’s view of Afghanistan was sort of like Henry Ford and the color of your car.  You can have any strategy you like as long as it’s COIN.  The senior military leadership really coalesced around one option and alternative points of view, such as a narrower focus on counterterrorism as advocated by Gen Cartwright, were really cast aside by the rest of the military leadership. 

While we were trying to get our head around Afghanistan, I do think it behooved the nation’s military community to really more fully understand what happened with the surge in Iraq and the application of counterinsurgency.  It had its benefits, but it had its limitations.  It wasn’t a panacea, and understanding the truth of itm and moving beyond the politics, is essential to understanding how this strategy can and should be applied in the future. 

You opened your question with a fundamental disconnect in America’s war strategy.  The goal was narrow – to go after al Qaeda – yet the approach was broad – population-centric COIN.  And it did involve a civ-mil mission creep.  I think both sides fed on each other.  Yes, the military had a very expansive view on what to do with governance, anti-corruption, and so forth as epitomized by Gen Petraeus’s Anaconda slide, but the civilians in many cases were goading them along.  Karl Eikenberry who outlined accurately the many failings of the Afghan government and the many reasons why a COIN strategy wouldn’t work as hoped for then went along with these grand efforts to try to rebuild the government, to create government in many cases where the Afghans didn’t have it--to bring in dozens and dozens of American investigators to pursue corruption cases which further frayed our relationship with Hamid Karzai.  We tried to do two things that were in conflict.  We wanted a war with narrow goals, but we fought it broadly.  And that just doesn’t work.  If really what we wanted to do was just go after al Qaeda, then that’s what we should have done.  If the overall stability of Afghanistan, the defeat of the Taliban, the improvement of lives for the Afghans was something that we found to be in the American national interest, then a comprehensive COIN strategy was defensible.  But if that wasn’t the overall goal, then the record shows that we should have been narrower.

COINsanity

I've followed the ongoing debates around the Counterinsurgency [COIN] theory of warfare for quite some time, especially during my ramp up to spend 15 months in Baghdad during the much vaunted 'Surge'. Folks like Gentile, Metz, McMasters and Nagl would take to the wonkish forums like Small Wars Journal and the Center for Defense Studies to defend their strategy of taming asymmetric warfare in the 21st century. The discussions waxed and waned over topics like understanding indigenuous cultural values and the efficacy of armor and artillery in a COIN environment. These men are not superstars outside of their arena, as the media has not given due diligence to the architects of strategies that have influenced national policy and news cycles....though one name had stood out the brightest and for the longest. LTC John Nagl [Ret] wrote Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, which was published in 2002, and soon became the rising star of a cadre nicknamed the COINdinistas.

COIN soon became the new currency of strategic success, coming at a time when our outlook for obtainable metrics in Iraq was rapidly diminishing. But as many have noted, COIN is not a band aid for bad national policy, nor poor planning.

Nagl is leaving the world of strategic studies and the Center for a New American Security, but the debate still rages on.

Learning to Eat Soup with a Spoon
The American Conservative

Cogent commentary on the TAC article
Small Wars Journal

Green on Blue attacks and the illogic of national policy

Nothing like friends and allies, eh? This is what we get when we attempt to nation build in a loose, tribal confederation...while propping still corrupt, former warlords as national leaders. The current Administration should be ashamed at not only not addressing this issue earlier with the Kabul regime....but for not addressing this issue with the American people. Political sensitivities should never outweigh the consequence when the lives of our forces are in danger from within.

Of course, had the previous Administration opted to continue the fight against al Qaeda, instead of embarking on both an errant civil and political reconstruction plan - and - an invasion of the nation that previously served as the counterweight to Iranian hegemony in the Persian Gulf.......we'd likely not be in this position today.

The political and social makeup of Afghanistan has not lent itself to the type of vetting processes needed to ensure that our freinds and allies really are our friends and allies. That we apparently thought different at the national level, is exasperated by the fact that we made much the same mistake in Iraq.

Our military is designed for - and maintains the Constitutional mandate to - shoot people in the face when they threaten US national security. The Taliban does not pose that threat, yet the overwhelming majority of military, analytical and fiscal assets are directed towards what can politely be called a mob of illiterate goat herders, who can infiltrate the ANSF with apparent ease - all the while al Qaeda remains aloof and largely unengaged.

A pretty good article on this recent rise on Green v. Blue attacks over at Defense IQ:

For the enemy in Afghanistan, nothing succeeds like success. The last year in Afghanistan has seen an increase in the frequency of attacks upon U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel by Afghans who were soldiers, recruits undergoing training, acting as embedded advisors, or otherwise occupying low-level security positions at bases or outposts jointly occupied.

If IEDs were eliminated as causal factors since July 2010, the percentage of all ISAF casualties in Afghanistan through hostile action reaches a staggering 33% caused by the intentional actions of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) or Afghan Security Guard (ASG) personnel. Put simply, one out of every three ISAF killed since June 2010 has been murdered by the Afghans he is training or otherwise serving with.[i] This may be the highest incidence of intentional fratricide in recorded military history.

The media have made much of this phenomenon and recent press statements on this issue by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Obama indicate the depth to which it continues to influence strategic policy. Defense Secretary Panetta’s recent trip to Afghanistan included a specific discussion of the issue with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, followed by yet another press statement which was gobbled up by a Western news media anxious to seize upon it as evidence of yet another strategic miscalculation by a superpower in quagmire.
 

Read the rest

My new favorite Pundit

To be sure, I'll not be agreeing with everything she writes, but I was taken this morning by Katie Kieffer's stunning beauty and her Memorial Day post on her website:

Let’s make foreign policy like it’s 2000. I think we will support our troops and vets by revisiting the foreign policy that former President Bush expressed in 2000. Otherwise, we will send brave hearts into vain battles.

In October, 2000, George W. Bush debated Al Gore on C-SPAN. He said:

“I think one way for us to end up being viewed as the ugly American is for us to go around the world saying: 

‘We do it this way, so should you.’ … It really depends upon how our nation conducts itself on foreign policy; if we’re an arrogant nation they’ll resent us; if we’re a humble nation, but strong, they’ll welcome us. …Somalia started out as a humanitarian mission then changed into a nation-building mission and that’s where the mission went wrong; the mission was changed, and, as a result, our nation paid a price and so I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called nation-building. …If we don’t stop extending our troops all around the world and [conducting] nation-building missions, then we are going to have a serious problem coming down the road and I’m going to prevent that.”

As we know, Bush did not fulfill his 2000 foreign policy goals. I think he was right to enter Afghanistan and route the Taliban immediately after the 9/11 attacks. Unfortunately, he overextended our stay and his executive reach. Today, Bush’s successor, President Obama, is proof that Bush was right in 2000. For, Obama’s efforts to ramp up Bush’s post-2000 expansionism are failing.

This month, Obama gathered his NATO partners in Chicago and signed an agreement that hands major combat operations over to Afghan security forces by the summer of 2013. (So much for consulting Congress and the Constitution.)

Nearly 11 years of war and $642 billion dollars are the temporal and monetary costs to U.S. taxpayers for the War in Afghanistan. No metric, however, quantifies the cost of elongated war to U.S. troops and veterans.

Obama should never have sent an additional 33,000 troops to risk their lives in this hopeless region in 2010. This month, bipartisan leaders of the congressional intelligence committee reported that the Taliban has become stronger since Obama’s troop surge. And, American troops are increasingly dying at the hands of our allies. Since 2007, around 80 Americans have died at the hands of our Afghan “partners.”

Obama should bring the troops home now—not in the summer of 2013. He can better utilize our troops on the U.S.-Mexico border where drug cartel violence threatens American ranchers, farmers and the U.S. food supply.

By keeping our troops and resources abroad, Obama is perpetuating a situation where current and former armed forces deal with suicidal depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

And I would be remiss if I didn't share the smoking goodness that is Katie.

I hope this post is formatted well, as I cannot preview. The filters on my domain at work block my blog due to "Adult Content".

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Afghanistan: Why a ‘Limited-Win’ is Sustainable

An article in this months International Policy Digest looks at the positive and negative effects of out planned withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. One particular excerpt of note illustrates the way the internal conflict [as that is really what we're fighting in AFG] will likely be framed once we depart in large numbers:

The withdrawal of Western forces and absence of a common enemy could exacerbate fractures between rival insurgent organizations. Moreover, a reduced Western presence in Afghanistan will prompt the war to morph in focus from a West vs. Muslim conflict to a Muslim vs. Muslim conflict. This transformation could have serious consequences for Taliban fundraising activities in the broader Muslim world.

And a cogent summary:

While the picture painted by most of the western media in Afghanistan is pessimistic, the way forward in Afghanistan, even under a strategy of a limited-win, will neither be easy nor assured of success. There remains a significant possibility that the West is simply too war weary to maintain even modest commitments of troops and funds past 2014. Moreover, even if the strategy of a limited-win is fully realized, the West is still left propping up a corrupt and ineffectual government for an indefinite period of time. Nonetheless, abandoning Afghanistan entirely will have serious adverse consequences for the stability of the region and the security of the West, which is why a strategy of a limited-win may prove the better of several bad alternatives.

The medium-term future is surely likely to remain one of limited financial and military resources, as the the number and nature of trouble spots around the world proliferates. Afghanistan cannot remain on life support indefinitely; after a decade of commitment from the West, the country must learn to stand on its own two feet.

Afghan National Police: Building competing with Reforming

An interesting assessment of the Afghan National Police for any foreign policy wonks out there, courtesy of Ink Spots.

From the Executive Summary:

The report refers to the problems of the dominance of military elements in buildingthe ANP. It is not clear whether the militarization of the ANP has significantly improved the chances of survival for members of the Afghan police. What is certain is that militarization cannot solve the problem of the weak legitimacy of the Afghan state. There is still a lack of trust between the public and the police, especially as the ANP is inadequately equipped to prevent or solve crimes. Moreover, the possible long-term consequences of militarization are problematic: It is easier to militarize the police now than it will be to drive out the spirit of militarization at a later date. The militarization of the ANP is therefore at the best ineffective and at the worst counterproductive. Only a police force which the people trust can be effective.

If this is true.....

Then Elvis has officially left the building and we are long past the time to completely withdraw:

NATO officials promised to meet Afghan nation’s demand of bringing to justice, through an open trial, those responsible for the incident and it was agreed that the perpetrators of the crime be brought to justice as soon as possible. - AFG GMIC

I don't take what the Afghan government says at face value, ever. But if NATO has agreed to such an act, it is a shameful day for the coalition.

Defining the Surge rhetoric

If you follow the story of the Iraq Surge, and it's aftermath, you quickly realize that there is an official story...one dutifully endorsed by the media. A story where the increase of US forces quelled the insurgency. A similar meme exists where Obama somehow 'lost the peace'....but I digress.

Doug Ollivant of the New America Foundation penned a piece last summer regrading this 'new orthodoxy', that I somehow missed until now; but found thanks to Musings on Iraq. He lays a fair amount of blame at the feet of President Obama for institutional ambiguity on Iraq and Afghanistan, while laying out a pretty solid counter-argument to the generally accepted dogma of how the violence in Iraq decreased, somewhat.


Countering the New Orthodoxy: Reinterpreting Counterinsurgency in Iraq

Resolving Insurgencies

A pretty good study out of the Strategic Studies Institute from June of last year by Thomas R. Mockaitis, on best approaches to resolve insurgencies based on historical examples and an analysis of current strategy. Two points that stood out, one from the author and another quoted statement:

The United States adopted the correct strategy for that war only in 2009, long after the conflict had become a chronic insurgency in which the Taliban fund their operations through the opium trade and exercise shadow governance over much of the country. Under these circumstances, the chances of a clear-cut victory are remote. Even achieving a compromise peace through co-option will be difficult. The United States must consider that it might have to withdraw without a satisfactory resolution to the insurgency. In that case, it will need to engage whoever governs Afghanistan to hold them accountable for terrorism launched from Afghan territory. 

"The West came into Afghanistan under the mantra of freedom is on the march,” observed Masood Farviar, manager of an Afghan radio network in a December 2010 interview with National Public Radio, “and elections are the cure-all for all the problems, without realizing that the last thing Afghans needed at the time was elections. And the first thing Afghans needed at the time was security.”22 In its rush to get a government in place—any government—the United States got one with little legitimacy or real power. A popular joke in Afghanistan has it that Hamid Karzai is supposed to be president but is really no more than the mayor of Kabul, and even that only until it is dark."

After engaging an upstanding fellow in a debate over the conclusion of the Iraq adventure and the current problems in Afghanistan over at TAH, I dug up one of the many files in my digital library for anyone else who may be a foreign policy nerd.

SSI

The Snickers Bar Theory of the Afghanistan War

An awesomely simple and truthful dissection of OEF-A, from Spencer Ackerman:

Ask yourself this: if there was no such thing as al-Qaida, would we ever fight the Taliban? If your answer is no, you understand where Biden’s coming from. But if your answer is yes, then let us visit the land of delicious candy.


Imagine a Snickers bar. The Taliban are the chocolate. al-Qaida is the precious gooey nougat inside. We care about the nougat. Nothing must get in the way of our pursuit of the nougat. The chocolate is in our way. So much worse for the chocolate.


The trouble with the Afghanistan war is that right now we care too much about the chocolate. You could make an argument that it’s worth caring about the chocolate because it’s better for us if the nougat goes uncovered. I found that compelling for a while, and to a degree still do. But we’re eating too much chocolate in southern Afghanistan; it’s hurting us in eastern Afghanistan; and it pulls us too deeply into the machinations of Afghan governance, which is like eating the wrapper.


Plus we’re finding out something significant in the drone war. We can eat a lot of nougat without eating any chocolate. The problem there (and also in Afghanistan) is that we also destroy innocent peanuts, with which the Taliban and al-Qaida deliberately intermingle. But we have a viable model for a nougat-centric strategy with minimal chocolate distraction. Biden, you’ll recall, pushed that model from the start.


There’s also a diplomatic reason for Biden to say the Taliban aren’t the U.S. enemy. Apparently, secret Taliban peace talks are at a critical juncture. Even if you don’t buy the Snickers Bar Theory of the Afghanistan War — and hey, look: I had to do this before Tom Friedman did — perhaps you’ll agree that we have an interest in ending the war through a peace deal, and if so, then Biden’s comment is useful to that effort. If you don’t agree that we actually do have an interest in a peace deal, then I’m afraid you’re advocating a chocolate-based diet that will lead to clogged American arteries.

Heroes are too rare indeed.....Dakota Meyer, MOH

For a man to charge into fire once requires grit that is instinctive in few men; to do so a second time, now knowing what awaits you, requires inner resolve beyond instinct; to repeat a third time is courage above and beyond any call of duty; to go in a fourth time is to know you will die; to go in a fifth time is beyond comprehension.

Dakota Meyer's performance was the greatest act of courage in the war, because he repeated it, and repeated it, and repeated it.

- Bing West

I generally loathe the UN....

But in the spirit of not shooting the messenger, I will grudgingly admit that the latest report on Afghanistan - The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, contains quite a bit of reporting not found on US airwaves. Sad considering the enormous effort and loss of life and limb that our nation is enduring in that region.

UNAMA